Influence in Weighted Committees by Kurz, Sascha et al.
Influence in Weighted Committees
Sascha Kurz
Dept. of Mathematics, University of Bayreuth, Germany
sascha.kurz@uni-bayreuth.de
Alexander Mayer
Dept. of Economics, University of Bayreuth, Germany
alexander.mayer@uni-bayreuth.de
Stefan Napel
Dept. of Economics, University of Bayreuth, Germany
stefan.napel@uni-bayreuth.de
Abstract
A committee’s decisions on more than two alternatives much depend on the adopted voting
method, and so does the distribution of power among the committee members. We investi-
gate how different aggregation methods such as plurality runoff, Borda count, or Copeland
rule map asymmetric numbers of seats, shares, voting weights, etc. to influence on outcomes
when preferences vary. A generalization of the Penrose-Banzhaf power index is proposed
and applied to the IMF Executive Board’s election of a Managing Director, extending a priori
voting power analysis from binary simple voting games to choice in weighted committees.
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1 Introduction
The aggregation of individual preferences by some form of voting is common in
politics, business, and everyday life. Members of a board, council, or committee are
rarely aware how much their collective choices depend on the adopted aggregation
rule. The importance of the method may be identified a posteriori by comparing
voting outcomes for a given preference configuration. For instance, suppose a hiring
committee involved three groups with n1 = 6, n2 = 5, and n3 = 3 members each
and the following preferences over five candidates {a, b, c, d, e}: a 1 d 1 e 1 c 1 b,
b 2 c 2 d 2 e 2 a, and c 3 e 3 d 3 b 3 a. If the groups voted sincerely (for
informational, institutional, or other reasons) then candidate a would have received
the position under plurality rule with 6 vs. 5 vs. 3 votes. However, requiring a runoff
between the front-runners, given that none has majority support, would have made b
the winner with 8 to 6 votes. Candidate c would have won every pairwise comparison
and been the Condorcet winner; Borda rule would have singled out d; candidate e could
have been the winner if approval voting had been used.
With enough posterior information, each voter group can identify a ‘most-prefer-
red voting method’ for the decision at hand: group 1 should have tried to impose
plurality rule in order to have its way; group 2 should have argued for plurality
runoff; and group 3 for pairwise comparisons. It is less obvious, though, how
adoption of one aggregation method rather than another will affect a group’s success
and influence a priori, i.e., not yet knowing what will be the applicable preferences,
or averaged across many decisions. More generally, can we verify if small groups
are enjoying a greater say when committees fill a top position, elect an official, etc.
by pairwise votes or by the plurality runoff method? Which rules from a given list
of suggestions tend to maximize (or minimize) voting power of a particularly sized
group in a committee? There is a huge literature on voting power but questions of
this kind have to our knowledge not been addressed by it yet.1 We seek to change
this by generalizing tools that were developed for analysis of simple voting games
with binary options (‘yes’ or ‘no’) to collective choice from m ≥ 3 alternatives.
The most prominent tools for analyzing the former are the Penrose-Banzhaf index
(Penrose 1946; Banzhaf 1965) and the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik 1954).
They evaluate the sensitivity of the outcome to changes in a given voter’s preferences
1The most closely related analysis seems to be the investigation of effectivity functions; cf. Peleg
(1984). See Felsenthal and Machover (1998), Laruelle and Valenciano (2008), or Napel (2019) for
overviews on the measurement of voting power.
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– operationalized as the likelihood of this voter being pivotal or critical: flipping its
vote would swing the collective decision – under specific probabilistic assumptions.
This paper applies the same logic to weighted committee games. These, more simply
referred to as weighted committees, are tuples (N,A, r|w) that specify a set N = {1, . . . ,n}
of players, a set A = {a1, . . . , am} of alternatives, and the combination r|w of an
anonymous voting method r (e.g., Borda rule, plurality rule, and so on) with a vector
w of integers that represents group sizes, voting shares, etc.
As in analysis of (binary) simple voting games, high a priori voting power of
player i ∈ N in a committee goes with high sensitivity of the outcome to i’s prefer-
ences. It can be quantified as the probability for a change in i’s preferences causing
a change of the collective choice. Although other assumptions could be made, we
focus on the simplest case in which all profiles of strict preference orderings are
equally likely a priori. This corresponds to the Penrose-Banzhaf index for m = 2. The
respective power indications help to assess who gains and loses from institutional re-
forms or whether the distribution of influence in a committee satisfies some fairness
criterion; they can also inform stakeholders, lobbyists, or other committee outsiders
with an interest in who has how much say in the committee.
2 Related Work
The distribution of power in binary weighted voting games has received wide at-
tention ever since Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, Ch. 10) formalized them
as a subclass of so-called simple (voting) games. See, e.g., Mann and Shapley (1962),
Riker and Shapley (1968), Owen (1975), or Brams (1978) for seminal investigations.
The binary framework can be restrictive, however. Even for collective ‘yes’-or-‘no’
decisions, individual voters usually have more than two options. For instance they
can abstain or not even attend a vote, and this may affect the outcome differently
than casting a vote either way. Corresponding situations have been formalized as
ternary voting games (Felsenthal and Machover 1997; Tchantcho, Lambo, Pongou, and
Engoulou 2008; Parker 2012) and quaternary voting games (Laruelle and Valenciano
2012). Players can also be allowed to express graded intensities of support: in ( j, k)-
games, studied by Hsiao and Raghavan (1993) and Freixas and Zwicker (2003, 2009),
each player selects one of j ordered levels of approval. The resulting j-partitions of
players are mapped to one of k ordered output levels; suitable power indices have
been defined by Freixas (2005a, 2005b).
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Linear orderings of actions and feasible outcomes, as required by ( j, k)-games,
are naturally given in many applications but fail to exist in others. Think of options
that have multidimensional attributes – for instance, candidates for office or an
open position, policy programs, locations of a facility, etc. Pertinent extensions of
simple games, along with corresponding power measures, have been introduced as
multicandidate voting games by Bolger (1986) and taken up as simple r-games by Amer,
Carreras, and Maga˜na (1998) and as weighted plurality games by Chua, Ueng, and
Huang (2002). They require each player to vote for a single candidate. This results
in partitions of player set N that, in contrast to ( j, k)-games, are mapped to a winning
candidate without ordering restrictions.
We will draw on the yet more general framework of weighted committee games
(Kurz, Mayer, and Napel 2019). Winners in these games can depend on the entire
preference rankings of voters rather than just the respective top. We conceive of
player i’s influence or voting power as the sensitivity of joint decisions to i’s actions
or likings. The resulting ability to affect collective outcomes is closely linked to
the opportunity to manipulate social choices in the sense of Gibbard (1973) and
?. Our investigation therefore relates to computational studies by Nitzan (1985),
Kelly (1993), Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999), or Smith (1999) that have quantified
the aggregate manipulability of a given decision rule. The conceptual difference
between corresponding manipulability indices and the power index defined below
is that the latter is evaluating consequences of arbitrary preference perturbations,
while the indicated studies only look at strategic preference misrepresentation that
is beneficial from the perspective of a player’s original preferences.2 Voting power
as we quantify it could be used for a player’s strategic advantage but it need not.
A ‘preference change’ might also be purely idiosyncratic, result from log-rolling or
external lobbying (where costs of persuasion can relate more to preference intensity
than a player’s original ranking of options), or could be a demonstration of power
for its own sake.
Other conceptualizations of the influence derived from a given collective choice
rule track the sets of outcomes that can be induced by partial coalitions. For instance,
Moulin (1981) uses veto functions in order to describe outcomes that given coalitions
of players could jointly prevent; Peleg’s (1984) effectivity functions describe the power
structure in a committee by a list of all sets of alternatives that specific coalitions of
2Nitzan (1985) also checked if outcomes could be affected by arbitrary variations of preferences
before assessing manipulation. He tracked this at the aggregate level, while we break it down to
individuals in order to link outcome sensitivity to voting weights.
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Rule Winning alternative at preference profile P
Borda rB(P) ∈ arg maxa∈A
∑
i∈N bi(a,P)
Copeland rC(P) ∈ arg maxa∈A
∣∣∣{a′ ∈ A | a PM a′}∣∣∣
Plurality rP(P) ∈ arg maxa∈A
∣∣∣{i ∈ N | ∀a′ , a ∈ A : aPia′}∣∣∣
Plurality runoff rPR(P)

= rP(P) if
∣∣∣{i ∈ N | ∀a′ ∈ A \ {rP(P)} : rP(P)Pia′}∣∣∣ > n2
∈ arg max
a∈{a(1),a(2)}
∣∣∣{i ∈ N | ∀a′ , a ∈ {a(1), a(2)} : aPia′}∣∣∣ otherwise
Schulze rS(P) – see Schulze (2011)
Table 1: Considered anonymous voting rules
voters can force the outcome to lie in. We, by contrast, follow the literature pioneered
by Penrose (1946), Shapley and Shubik (1954), and Banzhaf (1965), and try to assess
individual influence on outcomes concisely by a number between zero and one.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Anonymous Voting Rules
We consider finite sets N = {1, . . . ,n} of n voters or players such that each voter i ∈ N
has strict preferences Pi over a set A = {a1, . . . , am} of m ≥ 2 alternatives. We write abc
in abbreviation of aPibPic when the player’s identity is clear. The set of all m! strict
preference orderings on A is denoted by P(A). A (resolute) voting rule r : P(A)n → A
maps each preference profile P = (P1, . . . ,Pn) to a single winning alternative a∗ = r(P).
Rule r is anonymous if for any P ∈ P(A) and any permutation pi : N → N with
pi(P) = (Ppi(1), . . . ,Ppi(n)) we have r(P) = r(pi(P)).
We will restrict attention to truthful voting3 under one of the five anonymous
rules summarized in Table 1, assuming lexicographic tie breaking. See Laslier (2012)
on the pros and cons of a big variety of voting procedures. Our selection comprises
two positional rules (Borda, plurality), two Condorcet methods (Copeland, Schulze),
3In principle, power analysis could also be carried out for strategic voters. This would require
specifying the mapping from profiles of players’ preferences to the element of A (or a probability
distribution over A) which is induced by the selected voting equilibrium. Determination of the latter
usually is a hard task in itself and here left aside.
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and a two-stage procedure that is used for filling political offices in many European
jurisdictions (plurality runoff).
Under plurality rule rP, each voter simply names his or her top-ranked alternative
and the alternative that is ranked first by the most voters is chosen. This is also
the winner under plurality with runoff rule rPR if the obtained plurality constitutes
a majority (i.e., more than 50% of votes); otherwise a binary runoff between the
alternatives a(1) and a(2) that obtained the highest and second-highest plurality scores
in the first stage is conducted.
Borda rule rB has each player i assign m − 1, m − 2, . . . , 0 points to the alternative
that he or she ranks first, second, etc. These points bi(a,P) :=
∣∣∣{a′ ∈ A | aPia′}∣∣∣ equal
the number of alternatives that i ranks below a. The alternative with the highest total
number of points, known as its Borda score, is selected.
Copeland rule rC considers pairwise majority votes between the alternatives. They
define the majority relation a PM a′ :⇔
∣∣∣{i ∈ N | aPia′}∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣{i ∈ N | a′Pia}∣∣∣ and the
alternative that beats the most others according to PM is selected. Copeland rule
is a Condorcet method: if some alternative a beats all others, then rC(P) = a. The
same is true for Schulze rule rS. But while rC just counts the number of direct pairwise
victories, rS also considers indirect victories and invokes majority margins in order to
evaluate their strengths. rS then picks the alternative that has the strongest chain of
direct or indirect majority support (see Schulze 2011 for details). The attention paid
to margins makes rS more sensitive to voting weights than rC in case PM is cyclical.
Despite its non-trivial computation, rS has been applied, e.g., by the Wikimedia
Foundation and Linux open-source communities.
3.2 Weighted Committees
Anonymous rules treat any components Pi and P j of a preference profile P like in-
distinguishable ballots. Still, when a committee conducts pairwise comparisons,
plurality voting, etc., two individual preferences often feed into the collective deci-
sion rather asymmetrically because, e.g., stockholders have as many votes as they
own shares or the relevant players i ∈ N in a political committee cast bloc votes in
proportion to party seats. The resulting (non-anonymous) mapping from preferences
to outcomes is a combination of anonymous voting rule r with weights w1, . . . ,wn for
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players 1, . . . ,n that is defined for all P ∈ P(A)n by
r|w(P) := r([P1]w1 , [P2]w2 , . . . , [Pn]wn) = r(P1, . . . ,P1︸     ︷︷     ︸
w1 times
,P2, . . . ,P2︸     ︷︷     ︸
w2 times
, . . . ,Pn, . . . ,Pn︸     ︷︷     ︸
wn times
). (1)
The combination (N,A, r|w) of a set of voters, a set of alternatives and a particular
weighted voting rule defines a weighted committee (game). When the underlying
anonymous rule is plurality rule rP, then (N,A, rP|w) is called a (weighted) plurality
committee. Similarly, (N,A, rPR|w), (N,A, rB|w), (N,A, rC|w) and (N,A, rS|w) are referred
to as a plurality runoff committee, Borda committee, Copeland committee, and Schulze
committee. See Kurz et al. (2019) on structural differences between them.
Weighted committee games (N,A, r|w) and (N,A, r′|w′) are equivalent if the re-
spective mappings from preference profiles to outcomes a∗ coincide; that is, when
r|w(P) = r′|w′(P) for all P ∈ P(A)n. Equivalent games evidently come with equivalent
expectations for individual players to influence the collective decision (voting power)
and to obtain outcomes that match their own preferences (success). We will focus
on voting power and non-equivalent committees that involve either the same rule r
but different weights w and w′, or the same weights w but different rules r and r′.
Example questions that we would like to address are: to what extent does a change
of voting weights, implied for example by the recent re-allocation of voting rights
in the International Monetary Fund or party-switching of a member of parliament,
shift the respective balance of power? How does players’ attractiveness to lobbyists
change when a committee replaces one voting method by another?
4 Measuring Influence in Weighted Committees
Some obvious shortcomings notwithstanding (see, e.g., Garrett and Tsebelis 1999,
2001), voting power indices such as the Penrose-Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik
index have received wide attention in theoretical and applied analysis of binary
decisions. See, e.g., the contributions in Holler and Nurmi (2013). Most indices can
be seen as operationalizing power of player i as expected sensitivity of collective decisions
to player i’s behavior (Napel and Widgre´n 2004). Sensitivity in the binary case means
that, taking the behavior of other players as given, the collective outcome would have
been different had player i voted ‘no’ instead of ‘yes’, or ‘yes’ instead of ‘no’. Distinct
indices reflect distinct probabilistic assumptions about the voting configurations
that are evaluated. For instance, the Penrose-Banzhaf index is predicated on the
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assumption that the preferences of all n players are independent random variables
and the 2n different ‘yes’-‘no’ configurations are equally likely.
4.1 Power as (Normalized) Expected Sensitivity of the Outcome
It is not hard to generalize the idea of measuring influence as outcome sensitivity to
weighted committees (N,A, r|w). Continuing in the Penrose-Banzhaf tradition, we
will assume that individual preferences are drawn independently from the uniform
distribution overP(A), i.e., all profiles P ∈ P({a1, . . . , am})n are equally likely.4 In order
to assess the voting power of player i with weight wi, we perturb i’s realized prefer-
ences Pi to a random P′i , Pi ∈ P(A) and check if this individual preference change
would change the collective outcome.5 Specifically, using notation P = (Pi,P−i) with
P−i = (P1, . . . ,Pi−1,Pi+1, . . . ,Pn), we are interested in the behavior of indicator function
∆r|w(P; P′i) :=
1 if r|w(P) , r|w(P
′
i ,P−i),
0 if r|w(P) = r|w(P′i ,P−i).
(2)
We stay agnostic about the precise source of perturbations: the switch from Pi to
P′i might reflect a spontaneous change of mind or intentional preference misrepre-
sentation, e.g., because someone has bought i’s vote. Variations might also be the
result of a mistake or of receiving last-minute private information about some of the
candidates. Our important premise is only that: a committee member’s input to
the collective decision process matters more, the more influential player i is in the
committee and vice versa.
We can then quantify player i’s a priori influence or power – and compare it to
that of other players or for variations of r|w – by taking expectations over all (m!)n
conceivable P and all m! − 1 possible perturbations of Pi at any given P:
Îi(N,A, r|w) := E
[
∆r|w(P; P′i)
]
=
∑
P∈P(A)n
∑
P′i,Pi∈P(A) ∆r|w(P; P′i)
(m!)n · (m! − 1) , i ∈ N. (3)
4This is also known as the impartial culture assumption. It has limited empirical support (see, e.g.,
Regenwetter, Grofman, Marley, and Tsetlin 2012, Ch. 1) but is commonly adopted as a starting point
for assessing links between voting weights and power a priori. We leave the pursuit of other options
for future research (e.g., single-peakedness along a common dimension).
5One might also restrict attention to local perturbations, that is, only allow changes of Pi to adjacent
orderings. So when m = 3 and Pi = abc, one would impose the constraint P′i ∈ {acb, bac}. This would
not change the qualitative observations in the IMF section below.
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A value of Îi(N,A, r|w) = 0.25, for example, means that 25% of player i’s preference
variations would change the outcome.
The expected value in (3) equals the probability that a change of player i’s prefer-
ences from Pi to random P′i , Pi at a randomly drawn profile P affects the outcome.
It is zero if and only if player i is a null player, i.e., its preferences never make a differ-
ence to the committee decision. However, Îi(N,A, r|w) falls short of one for a dictator
player, i.e., when r|w(P) = a∗ if and only if player i ranks a∗ top: since only changes of
the dictator’s top preference matter, only (m!− (m− 1)!) out of m!− 1 perturbations of
Pi affect the outcome. We suggest to normalize power indications so that they range
from zero to one. Specifically, we focus on the voting power index I(·) with
Ii(N,A, r|w) :=
E
[
∆r|w(P; P′i)
]
(m! − (m − 1)!)/(m! − 1) =
∑
P∈P(A)n
∑
P′i∈P(A) ∆r|w(P; P′i)
(m!)n · (m! − (m − 1)!) , i ∈ N, (4)
denoting player i’s a priori influence or voting power in weighted committee (N,A, r|w).
The normalization destroys Îi(N,A, r|w)’s interpretation as a probability but fa-
cilitates comparison across committees. Regardless of how many alternatives and
players are involved, Ii(N,A, r|w) ∈ [0, 1] indicates how close player i is to being a
dictator in (N,A, r|w). Ii(N,A, r|w) = 0.5, for instance, implies that i’s influence lies
halfway between that of a null player and a dictator. So, on average, outcomes are
half as sensitive to i’s preferences than they would be if i commanded all votes.
4.2 Relationship to the Penrose-Banzhaf Index
For m = 2 alternatives, the denominators in (3) and (4) equal 2n and Ii(N,A, r|w) =
Îi(N,A, r|w). Moreover, for any of the rules r introduced above, weighted committees
coincide with the subclass of simple voting games (N, v) where v(S) ∈ {0, 1} is given by
v(S) = 1⇔ w(S) ≥ 12w(N) with w(T) :=
∑
i∈T wi for all T ⊆ N. If we consider the simple
game (N, v) induced by (N, {a1, a2}, r|w), its Penrose-Banzhaf index PBI(N, v) turns out
to coincide with I(N,A, r|w). Namely, PBI(·)’s usual definition then specializes to
PBIi(N, v) :=
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N\{i}
[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] (5)
=
∣∣∣{S ⊆ N \ {i} : w(S) < 12w(N) and w(S ∪ {i}) ≥ 12w(N)}∣∣∣
2n−1
.
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In this case, for r ∈ {rB, rC, rP, rPR, rS}with lexicographic tie-breaking,
∆r|w(P; P′i) = 1 ⇔ [r|w(Pi,P−i) = a1 and r|w(P′i ,P−i) = a2]
or [r|w(Pi,P−i) = a2 and r|w(P′i ,P−i) = a1]
⇔ w(
SP−i︷                 ︸︸                 ︷
{ j , i ∈ N : a1P ja2}) + wi ≥ 12w(N)
and w({ j , i ∈ N : a2P ja1}) + wi > 12w(N)
⇔ w(SP−i) < 12w(N) and w(SP−i ∪ {i}) ≥ 12w(N).
(6)
The last line substitutes w({ j , i ∈ N : a2P ja1}) = w(N)−wi −w(SP−i) where SP−i := { j ,
i ∈ N : a1P ja2}. Hence
Ii(N, {a1, a2}, r|w) =
∑
P∈P(A)n
∑
P′i∈P(A) ∆r|w(P; P′i)
2n
(7)
=
2 ·
∣∣∣{S ⊆ N \ {i} : w(S) < 12w(N) and w(S ∪ {i}) ≥ 12w(N)}∣∣∣
2n
= PBI(N, v)
as every S = SP−i ⊆ N \ {i} arises for two profiles (Pi,P−i) ∈ P(A)n, one involving a1Pia2
and the other a2Pia1.
5 Illustration
5.1 A Toy Example
As a first illustration let us evaluate the distribution of voting power when our
stylized hiring committee (see Introduction) with three groups of 6, 5, and 3 members
adopts Borda rule rB, that is weighted committee (N,A, rB|(6, 5, 3)). With |A| = 2
candidates, the applicant ranked first by any two groups wins. So all three players
are symmetric and have identical power according to the Penrose-Banzhaf or any
other established voting power index.
The symmetry is broken when three or more candidates are involved. Given
A = {a, b, c}, I(N,A, rB|(6, 5, 3)) evaluates all (3!)3 = 216 strict preference profiles
P ∈ P(A)3 and checks whether a change of player i’s respective preference Pi makes
a difference to the Borda winner. Table 2 illustrates this for profile P = (bca, abc, cba).
The Borda winner b at P has a score of 20 = 6 · 2 + 5 · 1 + 3 · 1 points vs. 10 for a vs. 12
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for c (first block of table). When preferences P1 = bca of group 1 are varied (second
block), changes to P′1 ∈ {abc, acb, cab, cba} result in a new Borda winner (indicated by
an asterisk) while P′1 = bac does not. Similarly, three out of five perturbations P
′
2 of
player 2’s preferences would change the outcome (third block); however, no variation
of P3 affects the committee choice (last block). The considered profile P = (bca, abc, cba)
therefore contributes (4/864, 3/864, 0) to I(·).
P = P′1 a b c P
′
2 a b c P
′
3 a b c
(bca, abc, cba) abc 22* 14 6 - - - - abc 16 20 6
⇓ acb 22* 8 12 acb 10 15 17* acb 16 17 9
a b c bac 16 20 6 bac 5 25 12 bac 13 23 6
10 20 12 - - - - bca 0 25 17 bca 10 23 9
cab 16 8 18* cab 5 15 22* cab 13 17 12
cba 10 14 18* cba 0 20 22* - - - -
Table 2: Effect of perturbation of P = (bca, abc, cba) to (P′i ,P−i) on Borda scores
Aggregating the corresponding figures for all P ∈ P(A)n yields
I(N,A, rB|(6, 5, 3)) = (588/864, 516/864, 312/864) ≈ (0.6806, 0.5972, 0.3611). (8)
So for the weights at hand, group 1 has almost 70% of the opportunities to swing
the collective choice that it would have when deciding alone. This figure is roughly
halved for group 3 even though both are symmetric when choosing between two
candidates. The comparison shows that traditional voting power indices for simple
voting games, such as PBI(·), can yield highly misleading conclusions when decisions
of the investigated institution involve more than m = 2 alternatives. (This is one of
the shortcomings alluded to earlier.) One can also see from the numbers in (8) that
I(·) need not add to one: the collective outcome at a given P may be sensitive to the
preferences of several players at the same time, or to those of none.6
Of course, manual computations as in Table 2 are tedious. It is not difficult,
though, to evaluate I(·) with a standard desktop computer for up to five alterna-
tives; and to compare the respective distribution of voting power to that arising from
other voting rules. Findings are summarized for r ∈ {rP, rPR, rB, rC, rS} in Table 3.
6Therefore, normalization PBI(N, v) = PBI(N, v)/
∑
i PBIi(N, v) is sometimes applied in binary vot-
ing analysis.
10
m = 3 m = 4 m = 5
I(rP|(6, 5, 3)) (0.6667, 0.4444, 0.4444) (0.7500, 0.3750, 0.3750) (0.8000, 0.3200, 0.3200)
I(rPR|(6, 5, 3)) (0.5556, 0.5556, 0.5000) (0.5833, 0.5833, 0.5000) (0.6000, 0.6000, 0.5000)
I(rB|(6, 5, 3)) (0.6806, 0.5972, 0.3611) (0.7372, 0.6246, 0.3644) (0.7631, 0.6462, 0.3839)
I(rC|(6, 5, 3)) (0.5509, 0.5509, 0.5509) (0.5851, 0.5851, 0.5851) (0.6098, 0.6098, 0.6098)
I(rS|(6, 5, 3)) (0.5972, 0.5278, 0.5278) (0.6584, 0.5426, 0.5426) (0.7011, 0.5515, 0.5515)
Table 3: Voting power in committee (N,A, r|(6, 5, 3)) for |A| = m and r ∈ {rP, rPR, rB, rC, rS}
As the comparison between m = 2 and 3 showed already, voting powers vary in
the number of alternatives. Under plurality rule, for instance, player 1 is closer to
having dictatorial influence, the more alternatives split the vote of players 2 and
3. I(N, {a1, . . . , am}, rP|(6, 5, 3)) tends to (1, 0, 0) as m → ∞ (given sincere voting and
independent preferences).7 That power of all three players coincides under rC con-
firms that Copeland rule extends the symmetry relation between players for m = 2
alternatives to any number m > 2 (see Kurz et al. 2019, Prop. 3).
5.2 Election of the IMF’s Managing Director
Evaluation of I(·) is, of course, more interesting for real-world institutions than toy
examples. We pick the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a case in point. Binary
power indices have been applied to it many times. See, e.g., Leech (2002, 2003),
Aleskerov, Kalyagin, and Pogorelskiy (2008), or Leech and Leech (2013). We extend
the analysis to election of the IMF’s Managing Director from three candidates by the
Executive Board.
The Executive Board consists of 24 members whose voting weights reflect financial
contributions to the IMF, so-called quotas. The six largest contributors – USA, China,
Japan, Germany, France and the UK – and Saudi Arabia currently provide one
Executive Director each. The remaining 182 countries are grouped into seventeen
constituencies. Each supplies one Executive Director who represents the group
members and wields their combined voting rights.
Various changes to the distribution of quotas have taken place since the IMF’s
7Comparative statics are more involved for other rules: bigger m tends to raise the share of profiles
P at which some perturbation of Pi affects the outcome but lowers the fraction of perturbations P′i that
do so for both player i and the hypothetical dictator used as normalization. Superposition of these
effects here increases power for all players and r ∈ {rPR, rB, rC, rS}, but this is not true in general.
11
inception in 1944 at Bretton Woods. The most recent reform was agreed in 2010 and
started to be implemented in 2016. A significant share of votes has shifted from the
USA and Europe to emerging and developing countries. In particular, China’s vote
share has gone up to 6.1% (compared to 3.8% before). India’s share increased to 2.6%
(2.3%), Russia’s to 2.6% (2.4%), Brazil’s to 2.2% (1.7%) and Mexico’s to 1.8% (1.5%).
On the occasion, the IMF also modified the election process for its key representative,
the Managing Director (currently: Christine Lagarde).
Prior to the reform, the process was criticized as intransparent and undemocratic:
the Managing Director used to be a European chosen in backroom negotiations with
the US. The new process is advertised as “open, merit based, and transparent” (IMF
Press Release 16/19): all Executive Directors and IMF Governors may nominate
candidates. If the number of nominees is too big, a shortlist of three candidates is
drawn up based on indications of support. From this shortlist the new Managing
Director is elected “by a majority of the votes cast” in the Executive Board.8
The IMF has neither publicly nor upon our email request specified what “majority
of the votes cast” exactly means to it for three candidates. We take the resulting room
for interpretation as an opportunity to simultaneously investigate the voting power
effects of the weight reform and of a procedural choice between using (i) plurality
rule, (ii) plurality with a runoff if none of three shortlisted candidates secures 50% of
the votes, or (iii) Copeland rule. In the spirit of earlier a priori analysis of the IMF, we
maintain the independence assumption that underlies PBI(·) and I(·). This provides
an a priori assessment of how level is the playing field created by weights as such
rather than an estimate of who wields how much influence on the next decision given
prevailing political ties, economic interdependencies, etc.
Influence figures in Table 4 are based on Monte Carlo simulations with sufficiently
many iterations so that differences within rows are significant with≥95% confidence.9
We find that 2016’s increase of vote shares for emerging market economies has indeed
raised their voting power, no matter which voting rule we consider. This is most
pronounced for China, with an increase of more than 50%. Influence of the groups
led by Brazil and Russia (incl. Syria) increased by about 18% and 12%, respectively;
8IMF Press Release 16/19, Part 4, holds that “Although the Executive Board may select a Managing
Director by a majority of the votes cast, the objective of the Executive Board is to select the Managing
Director by consensus . . . ”. The same is said in Part 3 about adoption of the “shortlist”. Our analysis
presumes that a consensus may not always be found – or it actually arises in the shadow of the
anticipated outcome of voting.
9 The only exception is that the difference between IJapan(rP|wpre) and IJapan(rP|wpost) is not sign-
ficant. The large number 624 > 4.7 · 1018 of preference profiles renders exact calculation of I(·)
impractical.
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Vote share (%) I(rP|w) I(rPR|w) I(rC|w)
wpre wpost wpre wpost wpre wpost wpre wpost
USA 16.72 16.47 0.7126 0.7030 0.6740 0.6653 0.6880 0.6790
Japan 6.22 6.13 0.1986 0.1989 0.2239 0.2233 0.2164 0.2159
China 3.80 6.07 0.1216 0.1967 0.1404 0.2209 0.1340 0.2135
Netherlands 6.56 5.41 0.2092 0.1755 0.2350 0.1983 0.2277 0.1910
Germany 5.80 5.31 0.1851 0.1720 0.2097 0.1950 0.2024 0.1876
Spain 4.90 5.29 0.1567 0.1718 0.1789 0.1945 0.1717 0.1871
Indonesia 3.93 4.33 0.1254 0.1403 0.1448 0.1607 0.1382 0.1538
Italy 4.22 4.12 0.1349 0.1337 0.1551 0.1533 0.1482 0.1465
France 4.28 4.02 0.1370 0.1306 0.1574 0.1499 0.1507 0.1432
United Kingdom 4.28 4.02 0.1369 0.1304 0.1574 0.1498 0.1506 0.1431
Korea 3.48 3.78 0.1114 0.1226 0.1291 0.1410 0.1230 0.1345
Canada 3.59 3.37 0.1150 0.1093 0.1332 0.1265 0.1268 0.1203
Sweden 3.39 3.28 0.1085 0.1063 0.1259 0.1231 0.1198 0.1171
Turkey 2.91 3.22 0.0932 0.1044 0.1088 0.1209 0.1032 0.1149
South Africa 3.41 3.09 0.1091 0.1001 0.1267 0.1162 0.1205 0.1104
Brazil 2.61 3.06 0.0835 0.0993 0.0979 0.1154 0.0927 0.1096
India 2.80 3.04 0.0898 0.0988 0.1048 0.1147 0.0993 0.1089
Switzerland 2.94 2.88 0.0941 0.0935 0.1097 0.1087 0.1041 0.1030
Russian Federation 2.55 2.83 0.0817 0.0920 0.0957 0.1070 0.0905 0.1015
Iran 2.73 2.54 0.0874 0.0823 0.1024 0.0962 0.0970 0.0910
Utd. Arab Emirates 2.57 2.52 0.0822 0.0817 0.0963 0.0955 0.0911 0.0904
Saudi Arabia 2.80 2.01 0.0896 0.0652 0.1046 0.0767 0.0992 0.0723
Dem. Rep. Congo 1.46 1.62 0.0465 0.0526 0.0555 0.0621 0.0521 0.0584
Argentina 1.84 1.59 0.0587 0.0515 0.0695 0.0610 0.0654 0.0573
Table 4: Influence in IMF Executive Board for pre- and post-reform weights and m = 3
(groups as of Dec. 2018 indicated by largest member, Nauru included in wpost)
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that of the Turkish and Indonesian group by about 11% each; the Indian and Spanish
(incl. Mexico and others) groups gained about 10% and 9%, respectively. Intended or
not, the South African group lost about 8% of its a priori voting power; Saudi Arabia
is the greatest loser with roughly 27%. Germany, France and UK each lost between
5% and 7% while voting power of the USA stayed largely constant.
The computations exhibit a simple pattern regarding the adopted interpretation
of ‘majority’: voting power of the USA is higher for plurality rule than for Copeland
than for plurality runoff; the opposite applies to all other (groups of) countries. This
echoes findings for our toy example: the largest player’s influence was highest for
rP; small and medium players were more influential under rPR and rC.
6 Towards More General Rule Comparisons
It seems worthwhile to check whether observations like the ones above are robust:
does the largest group benefit from plurality votes or the smallest from pairwise
comparisons in general? And can recommendations for maximizing a player’s in-
fluence be given also if information about the exact distribution of voting weights
is vague or fluctuates? We take a first step beyond specific examples and look for
possible size biases of the rules. Attention is restricted to small numbers of players
and alternatives, namely n = m = 3. The respective intuitions may still apply more
generally to shareholder meetings, weighted voting in political bodies, etc.
We use the standard projection of the 3-dimensional simplex of relative weights
to the plane in order to represent all possible weight distributions among three
players: vertices give 100% of voting weight to the indicated player, the midpoint
corresponds to (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), etc. Each figure presents the result of comparing influence
of player 1 under some rule ρA vs. rule ρB. Areas colored green (red) indicate weight
distributions for which I1(N,A, ρA) >(<) I1(N,A, ρB). Borda rule was found to be
particularly sensitive to weight differences by Kurz et al. (2019); when it is involved
in a comparison, we use darker tones of green or red to indicate greater influence
differences.
6.1 Borda vs. Plurality
The major cases that arise when we compare player 1’s influence in Borda vs. plu-
rality committees are numbered in Figure 1. We focus on w1 , w2 , w3 and write
w˜i = wi/(w1 + w2 + w3), w+−1 = max{w˜2, w˜3}, and w−−1 = min{w˜2, w˜3}. The following rec-
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ommendations could be given to an influence-maximizing player 1 if the procedural
choice between rB and rP is at this player’s discretion:
• If you wield the majority of votes (region 1) impose plurality rule.
Namely, w˜1 > 23 makes you both a plurality and Borda dictator (region 1a);
2
3 ≥ w˜1 > 12 implies dictatorship only under plurality rule (region 1b).
• Also impose plurality rule (region 5)
– if your weight is smallest and both other players have a third to half of the
votes each (13 ≤ w−−1 < 12 ), or
– if you have less than a third of votes and the largest player falls short of
the majority by no more than a quarter of the remaining player’s votes
( 12 > w
+
−1 ≥ 12 − 14w−−1).
• Otherwise, as a good ‘rule of thumb’, impose Borda rule.
Namely, when some other player holds the majority (region 2, w+−1 >
1
2 ) the
observations for region 1 essentially get reversed. In case that nobody holds
the majority, Borda comes with greater influence if you are second-largest with
at least a third of votes (region 4, 12 > w
+
−1 > w˜1 ≥ 13 ). This extends weakly to
when you are largest (region 3). The only exception to the rule are two small
subregions where all weights are similar but w˜1 > w˜+−1 >
1
3 > w˜
−
−1.
6.2 Further Comparisons
Analogous pairwise influence comparisons are depicted in the Appendix for all
possible weight distributions w and r ∈ {rB, rC, rP, rPR, rS}. Again, Borda’s high re-
sponsiveness to weight differences makes for more detailed case distinctions (see
Figures A-1–A-4). By contrast, when plurality rule is compared to either Copeland,
plurality runoff, or Schulze rule (Figure A-5), the recommendation always is sim-
ple and intuitive: plurality rule maximizes influence if you have the most votes. If
anyone else has more votes, your influence is greater (at least weakly) under the
respective other rule.
Recommendations to an influence-maximizing player are similar for Copeland vs.
Schulze rule (Figure A-6): if you wield a plurality of votes, Schulze comes with greater
influence; in case someone else has more votes, it is the opposite. For Copeland vs.
plurality runoff (Figure A-7), the former gives greater influence to you if you have
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Borda vs.	Plurality m=3
1 2
3
1a
1b
3
4
4
5
2
2
Figure 1: Borda vs. plurality for m = 3. Regions colored green (yellow/red) indicate that
Borda influence is greater than (equal to/smaller than) plurality influence
at least the second-most votes. If player 1 is to choose between plurality runoff and
Schulze rule (Figure A-8), Schulze rule gives greater influence if w1 is either largest
or smallest; otherwise it is better to adopt plurality runoff.
6.3 Influence-maximizing Voting Rules
Complementing pairwise comparisons as in Figures 1 and A-1–A-8, one can also
check directly which of the considered voting rules maximizes a specific player’s
a priori voting power at any given weight distribution. This is done in Figure 2:
configurations of same color indicate the same set of influence-maximizing voting
rules for player 1. (When the respective weight regions are lines or single points,
we have manually enlarged them.) Tongue-in-cheek, Figure 2 provides a ‘map’ for
influence-maximizing chairpersons – or for whoever has a say on the adopted voting
rule and cares about a priori influence on decisions between three candidates. It also
gives players 2 or 3 reason for criticizing adoption of a particular rule as biased.
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rP, rPR, rB, rC, rS
rP, rPR, rC, rS
rC, rS
rP, rB
rB, rC
rP
rPR
rB
rC
Figure 2: Maximal influence map for Borda, Copeland, plurality, plurality runoff, and
Schulze rules for m = 3.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated how the distribution of voting power in a committee depends
not only on voting weights but which of the many possible aggregation procedures
for m > 2 alternatives is adopted – from simple plurality voting to the elaborate
computation of Schulze winners. Traditional measures of voting power, such as
the Penrose-Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik indices, fail to capture this. They should be
accompanied by power indices for three or more alternatives.
One such index has been proposed and illustrated here. It evaluates how sensitive
the collective choice under the given aggregation rule and weights is to preference
changes by an individual player. The index is proportional to the probability for a
random individual preference perturbation to affect the outcome, assuming prefer-
ences are independently uniformly distributed a priori.10 A dictator player’s voting
power is normalized to one; a null player’s power is zero. The extent to which
10It as an open challenge to find properties or ‘axioms’, like those used by Dubey and Shapley
(1979) or Laruelle and Valenciano (2001) for the Penrose-Banzhaf index, that would characterize the
proposed index without making specific probability assumptions. Our attempts have failed so far.
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the distribution of weights matters differs across rules. So do comparative statics
regarding the number of alternatives. How the adopted rule affects the distribu-
tion of voting power has been illustrated for (non-consensual) election of the IMF’s
Managing Director by its Executive Board. Similar analysis might be conducted for
multi-candidate election primaries, party conventions, corporate boards, etc.
Several case studies have shown with the benefit of hindsight how choice of a
particular voting method may have affected big political decisions (cf., e.g., Leininger
1993; Tabarrok and Spector 1999; or Maskin and Sen 2016). We deem it worthwhile to
evaluate collective choice methods also from an a priori perspective and ‘on average’.
For the simplest case with three options, we have considered the power implications
of all conceivable weight distributions among three players and identified differences
in how several prominent rules translate weights into voting power. Except for
Borda rule, precise knowledge about the distribution of voting weights is typically
not needed for gaging the sensitivity of outcomes to preferences of a large, middle,
or small player respectively. It is of course desirable to obtain results also for bigger
numbers of players and alternatives in the future.
Our analysis hopefully encourages the extension of voting power analysis to
richer choice settings. There is a great variety of single-winner rules that could be
added to the influence map in Figure 2 (see, e.g., Aleskerov and Kurbanov 1999;
Nurmi 2006, Ch. 7; or Laslier 2012). And nothing in principle would preclude similar
analysis for multi-winner elections (see, e.g., Elkind, Faliszewski, Skowron, and
Slinko 2017) or strategic voting equilibria, at least for restricted preference domains.
It also seems worthwhile to investigate weight apportionment for two-tiered voting
systems, such as US presidential elections, with more than two promising candidates.
It is unknown, for instance, how the Penrose square root rule for the independent
binary case (see, e.g, Felsenthal and Machover 1998, Ch. 3.4) or Shapley linear rule for
affiliated spatial preferences (cf. Kurz, Maaser, and Napel 2018) extend to two-tiered
plurality decisions or plurality voting with a runoff.
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Appendix: Comparisons of voting rules form= 3
Borda vs.	Plurality m=3
1 2
3
Figure A-1: Borda vs. plurality (repeated from p. 16)
Borda vs.	Copeland	m=3
1 2
3
Figure A-2: Borda vs. Copeland
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Borda vs.	PluralityR m=3
1 2
3
Figure A-3: Borda vs. plurality runoff
Borda vs.	Schulze	m=3
1 2
3
Figure A-4: Borda vs. Schulze
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Plurality vs.	Copeland	m=3
1 2
3
Figure A-5: Plurality vs. plurality runoff, Copeland and Schulze
Copeland	vs.	Schulze	m=3
1 2
3
Figure A-6: Copeland vs. Schulze
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Copeland	vs.	PluralityR m=3
1 2
3
Figure A-7: Copeland vs. plurality runoff
PluralityR vs.	Schulze	m=3
1 2
3
Figure A-8: Plurality runoff vs. Schulze
26
